



Sometimes adapting new ideas is as difficult as inventing them. 
In the area of theory and sociology of law the situation is even 
more complicated because almost all important issues may 
concern political values, ideologies or pure individual interests. 
Bút one of the most demanding areas in this respect is the 
sociology of the legal personnel, since the scientific community 
at least partly belongs alsó to this group of people. Identities 
and sensibilities apart, this short essay might serve as a 
thought-provoking argumentation fór using new perspectives 
in sociological research of the legal system.
In this short essay I intend to show the relevance of 
the sociological perspective concerning the role of legal 
professions. There are alsó valuable historical analogies, bút 
Central European new democracies give rich research field.
Since constitutional institutions are still suffering from 
weak legitimation and pre-democratic cultural background, 
professional craftsmanship has to have outstanding effects on 
the skeleton of the rule of law and democracy. Mostly they are 
the designer, architects of the future building of democracy. 
The hindrance of this historical role in somé cases is the etatist, 
predemocratic value system as a consequence of the forty 
years socialization. The aim of this text is to shed somé light to 
a rather neglected field of legal sociology.
Legal professions during social and legal changes
Péter Esterházy in his brilliant essay, arguing on the humán 
hardships of the transformation in Hungary has written: 
“Everything has been changed only we remained the same.” This
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State of affairs has brought about tremendous strains, paradoxes and burdens which 
post-communist societies must face, and alsó somé unavoidable disappointments 
which continue even long after the actual events of the peaceful revolution have 
ceased.1 The writer here emphasized the personal and social continuity as well as the 
permanent responsibility fór the pást, bút we cannot be entirely persuaded about the 
unchanged character of the actors who had made and suffered these transformations. 
During large-scale changes social actors usually undergo deep changes too, which 
in turn have transformed the previously altered environment and introduced yet new 
changes. These circles are sometimes virtuous, sometimes vicious.
The disappointments in Hungary and other post-communist countries over somé 
inherently unrealizable hopes, such as swift economic success and wealth, a more 
efficient functioning of the welfare institutions, created a new set of barriers to the 
social, political and legal development, which allowed the sociological literature on the 
question of trust in the institutions to flourish. As Krygier added, somé fulfilled hopes, 
after a short time turnéd out to be “ugly” : rule of law is nőt so nice or important term 
in the popular understanding, than are matéria! justice or equality. The unintended 
consequences of transformation are now very clear and painful: the huge social 
inequalities, poverty, atavistic nationalism, anti-Semitism, and populism, an ineffective 
State and legal system, etc. The societies that broke away from socialism have 
found themselves in a State of constant flux full of challenges and transformations 
which are grasped as crises, and produce anomy, decreasing ethical standards both 
individually and socially.
Somé years after the revolutions towards democracy, bút before consolidation 
of the new values (individual rights, minority rights, constitutional barriers) sensitive 
intellectuals have noticed a decline in the liberal values and practices, this 
tendency is summarized as the “velvet restoration” or “post-fascism” . The rebirth of 
egalitarianism, collectivism, anti-liberalism, and even anti-intellectualism seems like a 
central-European evergreen that has never really disappeared. Bút these features are 
nőt completely unknown in the West either, here too there is a generál apathy about, 
and distrust of traditional politics, as well as emerging intolerance toward strangers. 
Despite these and other detrimental phenomena, western societies seem to remain 
solid since they work with impersonal institutions backed by strong traditions. 
However, even the safety in these traditions could nőt guarantee these developed 
societies complete immunity from injurious tendencies as we saw in the case of 
fierce US hysteria, the Italian populist right and other failings. Democratic processes 
with long cultural traditions can alsó be influenced although there is always a much 
stronger hope of recovery. According to Tismaneanu new democracies are extremely 
vulnerable to upheaval because institutional, morál, and attitudinal corruptions go 
hand in hand with a new untried form of governance. The peculiarity of this situation 
is that a corporatist, authoritarian inclination, as well as a revolt against formai 
institutions and the reinvention of the pre-democratic traditions dominate the political 
agenda. While people have lost their illusions about democratization most of them 
would give up their autonomies and liberties fór matéria! benefits, and improved social




welfare. This constellation serves as good grounds fór paternalist and demagogic 
political forces seeking charismatic figures in politics to take charge. Ethnocentric 
argumentation, homogenous and vague collectivity against individual freedom and 
free thinking are nőt new additions in this region as the irrational, emotional political 
style, which emphasizes personal qualities, and authority instead of dense and 
legitimate institutions, and civic virtue. Weak institutionalization makes the lack of 
constitutional patriotism more serious: the State as a limited agent with constitutional 
legitimacy has nőt yet become an accepted figure fór the incompetent and corrupt 
institutional entities which are full of selfish and unreliable politicians and fruitless 
ideological debates.2
According to a recent survey conducted by the author, the prestige of the 
parliamentary democracy has diminished: parliament as an institution appeared as 
an ineffective quarrelling branch without considerable power.
Despite the fact that the more or less successful European unification process 
largely forced institutional changes, the new member States entered the EU 
with changed societies too.3 European monitoring procedures and programs, 
recommendations and official criteria on institutional stability, democracy, rule of law, 
humán rights, protection of minorities focused on institution-building bút meanwhile, 
and in spite of the social tensions, problems of legitimacy, and bad attitudes toward 
the legal system — these formai measures partly firmed up both the value system 
and attitudes of the society. Readers might well find two contradictory evaluations of 
the transformation of the newly emerged democracies behind these argumentations. 
Studying the role of the legal institutions and professional lawyers inside these 
institutions I have found it useful to depart from both institutional optimism and 
cultural pessimism, and refer to a new starting point fór sociological research.4 This 
is even more important to get rid of the highly political evaluation of a situation that 
I call institutional pessimism. While institutional optimism and cultural pessimism 
were divergent perspectives of the scientists and western advisors, this new kind of 
pessimism stems from inside the core of the nation, as a result of the disappointments 
that continue years after the change to democratic rule. Institutional pessimism means 
heavy cynicism over the function of the legal and political institutions and a much 
stronger reliance on such “ irrational” forces as fortune, fate, and personal ability. 
The social basis of this feeling is understandable: as a lesson from pást experience a 
considerable part of the society thinks that law is synonymous with Central command, 
the legal system is a sheer tool of the rulers or the richest strata of the populace, 
the function of the legal system is to govern, manipulate society, and society should 
defend itself. Post-communist societies generally (bút with huge differences between
2 Vladimír Tismaneanu, Discomforts of Victory: democracy, liberal values, and nationalism in 
post-communist Europe, European University Institute, Florence 2002
3 Stephan Parmentier, Implications of Enlargement fór the Rule of Law and Constitutionalism in 
Post-Communist Legal Orders, draft paper, http://www.iue.it/LAW/Events/WSWorkshopNov2003/ 
Parmentierpaper. pdf
4 Martin Krygier, Institutional Optimism, Cultural Pessimism and the Rule of Law in Martijn Krygier 
& Adam Czarnota, eds. The Rule of Law after Communism. Problems and Practices in East- 
Central Europe, Aldershot, Ashgate/Dartmouth, 1999, 77-105
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them) lack social trust and trust in institutions. There is a tendency to view the State 
and legal institutions as the enemy, antipode of the civil society.5 This is a strong 
legacy of the dissident thinking of “antipolitics” which had an anti-positivistic meaning 
in a legal-theoretical sense.
I strongly feel that in order to understand post-communist societies a more 
complex relationship between institutions and actors must be construed, which is nőt 
new in theoretical sociology, bút neither is it so widely used in research.
The relation between actors and structures is a highly complex and constantly 
debated subject in the theory of social Sciences. Fór sociology of law this challenge 
touches the very essence of the role and effects of law in society. It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to assess this long theoretical history, and I alsó omit any discussion 
on the new lines in institutionalism, both historical and sociological. Nevertheless it 
is necessary to acknowledge the relevance of this tradition fór further analysis. Fór 
the moment let us take one elemental lesson from these theories. Following somé 
attempts to adjust the divergent traditions of social Science, we should find the 
connections and mutual effects of actors and institutions.
Ignoring determinism, working institutions generally give the context and 
environment fór the behavior of the humán agents and effectively limit the scope 
of their actions. Bút actors working with and inside these institutions can alsó form 
those institutions during functioning. Take here only one example: judges sitting in 
the constitutional courts must conform to the institutional barriers to their actions that 
are designed by the law-maker. Flowever, during their assessment of a case they alsó 
have the possibility of defining their own concept of practice and forming an activist, 
or a more or less restrained position. This kind of defining activity is nőt peculiarly 
eastern or Central European and can be found everywhere in constitutional systems. 
Bút it plays an astounding role in newly established constitutional courts, which have 
no or few traditions to fali back on. As is well known, institutional frameworks perform 
a reflexíve barrier to inventive humán actions. It is true even during formative years, 
when humán creativity plays decisive roles.
Krygier has argued lucidly about the importance of legal traditions, saying that 
even in hard cases there are legal answers to legal questions, because after principles 
run out, legal traditions remain considerable.6 Nonetheless legal traditions are 
somewhat problematic in societies such as Flungary, Poland or other post-communist 
nations. Even so, I strongly agree with the evaluation that lawyers, and especially 
judges are key players in shaping the legal traditions because of their craftsmanship, 
skills, methods and competence. This legal group has played such an important role, 
more so than intellectuals have done in generál, in creating national traditions in the 
19th century: they have invented and formed the constitutional and legal traditions. 
Starting from the prescriptive natúré of the legal tradition, it is necessary to balance
5 Adam Czarnota: Meaning of Rule of Law in Post-Communist Society. Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 17 
(179—196)
6 Martin Krygier, Thinking Like a Lawyer, in: Wojciech Sadurski (Ed.) Ethical Dimensions of Legal 
Theory, Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA, 1991
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cautiously between preserving and changing these elements while looking closely at 
the post-communist developments.
“ ...the pást does nőt merely speak to the present; it prescribes tor it. They are 
institutionalized: transmission of the law is nőt lett to chance bút is organized and 
regulated by institutions of recorders, transmitters and authoritative interpreters.”7
It is widely accepted in the social Sciences, that the new democracies of Europe 
have more or less successfully changed their political, economic and legal systems. 
This is a historically unique venture considering the complex program and relatively 
short time it has taken to implement it. This is alsó true of the legal system, somé 
parts of which have been transformed completely, sometimes outside, or contrary 
to, the traditions, while other parts proved to be more problematic, biased or strongly 
resisted any changes.
During evaluation of the changes and stability throughout the nation, which 
remains one of the most important theoretical issues of legal sociology, one can 
differentiate between at least two types of non-changes. Continuities in the legal 
system in post-communist societies are conservative or Progressive according to 
the openness fór such normative (prescriptive) ends as rule of law, constitutionalism, 
democracy, etc. Among the positive or Progressive continuities the most generál 
is the basic structure of the civil law system which, in itself, gives many possibilities 
fór planned legal reforms and promises greater success because of the formal- 
rational character, reliance on codification and rational law-making.8 Evén during the 
totalitarian régimé and later in the context of post-totalitarian socialism, the positivist 
feature of the legal system, namely the fact that written regulation must be taken intő 
consideration, offered judges relatively safe protection against the sheer demands of 
the political elite groups. The institutional basis of the legal system was permanently 
stable following a short revolutionary period when lay elements in the administration 
of justice and legal education had been pút in piacé The initial communist ideological 
assumption of laicization had been strongly limited in all east European countries 
both by dictatorial Stalinism and by the pragmatic post-revolutionary leadership, 
with somé interesting exemptions in East-Germany.9 *During the period of reform, in 
those countries where reform has been initiated this institutional tradition served as 
a useful technique fór distancing the government from the communist ideology and 
lawlessness.
Much better known are the conservative continuities or structural remnants that 
thwarted proposed transformations during the course of the “constitutional revolution”. 
We cannot provide an exhaustive list of the structural obstructions to transformation 
bút somé of them must be mentioned here.
7 s.n. 86. p.
8 Charles H. Koch: The Advantage of the Civil Law Judicial Design as the Model fór Emerging 
Legal Systems, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 11.
9 Boros László, Fleck Zoltán, Gyulavári Ágnes, Die Beteiligung von Laien an dér Rechtspflege im
sozialistischen Ungarn, lus Commune Sonderhefte (Studien zűr Europaischen Rechtsgeschichte), 
Recht im Socialismus Bánd 2. Justizpolitik, Hrsg: Gerd Bender, Ulrich Fáik, Vittorio Klostermann, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1999, 147-199
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Despite somé legislative efforts during the first years following transformation, 
deregulation was only partly successful: the Hungárián legal system remained 
simultaneously over- and under-regulated, although many low-level decrees were 
annulled by legislation, and the Constitutional Court alsó took part of this process 
as a constitutional selector of the old legal system. Bút, as usual, large-scale 
transformation of the economy, building a democratic political environment, and 
generál modernization encouraged greater law-making activity and, as is well known, 
speed never serves quality and prudence. (As a law-making factory, Hungárián 
Parliament has often created regulations which were after a short time proved to be 
useless or have been modified several times. Technical faults made judges mad or 
severely skeptic about Parliament.) Despite the notable volume of deregulation, the 
number of legal norms in operation has enourmously expanded.10
From the perspective of constitutional stability and progress the effects of the 
pást on society might be more important, since this issue concerns the effectiveness 
of the legal system through its position in the norms and institutions of the country. 
Disregarding the remnants of attitudes and outlooks created by the earlier political 
system — the lack of good manners and decided lack of trust in the authorities 
— allowance should be made fór a particular form of backwardness, fór instance the 
mentality of legal staff, the professions and, especially the judiciary which had been 
directly involved with the function of State and law under communism.11 Quoting only 
one example: judges sitting on the upper courts often use a logic in cases of freedom 
of the press, which practically bán the critique of officialdom. In the eyes of these 
judges the hard critic of State institutions and bureaucrats is something abnormal.1 2
10 Invalidated legal norms in Hungary, 1990-2004
1990-2000 2000-2004
A c t o f Parliam ent 373 259
G ovem m en ta l decree 1248 1236
M inisteria l decree 3187 2810
Legal norms in operation in Hungary, 1990-2004 
1. Acts of Parliament
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
350 425 494 587 670 765 869 983 1054 1027 1148 1240 1299 1264 1381






11 Fleck Zoltán, Judicial independence and its environment in Hungary, in: Priban, Young, Roberts 
(eds.): Systems of Justice in Transformation, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003
12 Fleck Zoltán, Freedom of the press in the civil adjudication, in press
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As already seen in the European unification process, and alsó from a broader 
view of progress, it became clear after somé years that the proper application of the 
results of new legislation is more challenging than creating new rules.13
It would be too undemanding to State that humán rights, constitutional values, 
freedoms are nőt part of the legal culture, and we should nőt wait fór effective 
working in this respect. Such a statement is pure cultural pessimism, which can be 
overcome. Bút there are factual pitfalls, among other things, attached to the Creative 
application of the legal decrees, with the judicial application of the Constitution 
and constitutional values, and with the Wholesale bureaucratic positivism. This is 
because legal staff have been trained to apply the written law only, and to évadé 
any political interpretation of higher norms or values. At the same time we must be 
aware of the fact that this peculiarity of the law in Hungary had an important function 
in self-defence fór the judges under communism. Nevertheless the present State is 
in somé respects confusing in the West alsó, regarding perhaps the evaluation of 
judges’ work, bureaucratic pressures, and the ability of using European case law. In 
addition to these challenges the new democracies must face up to somé new- born 
misinterpretations, such as that of the independence of the judiciary, by which somé 
magistrates try to use this constitutional value as an ultimate defence against public 
criticism and as a safeguard against open debates on verdicts.
Because Hungary and somé other former communist countries — with different 
argumentation and causes — did nőt change the legal personnel, remnants of old 
attitudes could nőt be eliminated by simple administrative changes. Evén the former 
GDR, where scrutinizing legal professions was carried out on a large-scale, did nőt 
escape completely from the troubles, and the radical solution asked a considerable 
price as can be seen from a highly sophisticated portrayal of the events.14 The 
purging processes after one and a halt decades are nőt on the scene, bút waiting 
fór a generation shift seems alsó to be a misleading tactic. Evading the fashionable 
institutional pessimism I think that the implementation of somé new techniques of 
formai education fór the professionals is nőt the only valuable result of the earlier 
decade, bút it is the legal institutional environment itself that creates — albeit slowly 
— the proper functioning. When properly established, institutions are able to breed 
well functioning actors. We must go much further in praising the results than the line 
of reasoning indicated below.
“Administrative and court reform was nőt very successful during the first 
decade oftransition. Much time and money was invested with disappointing results 
overall. However, there are reasons fór hoping that investment was nőt altogether 
lost. Both the EU and the candidate countries have gained considerable experience 
in how and how nőt to promote this reform effectively. ”15
13 Frank Emmert, Administrative and Court Reform in Central and Eastern Europe, European Law 
Journal, Vol. 9. No. 3. pp. 288-315. According to a recent survey Hungárián judges practically do 
nőt refer to European Court's decisions. (Fundamentum, 2005/2.)
14 Inga Markovits, Imperfect Justice: An East-West Germán Diary, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995
15 Emmert, p. 315.
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The question of how to ensure the conformity of the legal practitioners, particularly 
in times of radical political transformations is nőt new in the history.16 Anewborn 
political régimé (following sharp political-ideological swings) ordinarily had to redefine 
its relationship to the legal staff. (In the Germán instance there were at least four 
good examples of this kind of recasting.) Because bringing in new laws and even 
introducing an extensive normative change is rarely sufficient to bring lawyers in line 
with the régimé, alternative measures usually have to be established fór ensuring 
conformity. According to Hubert Rottleuthner’s enumeration the arsenal ranges from 
legal education to disciplinary sanctions. Among the tremendous changes in Central 
European legal systems, somé are really suitable fór strengthening conformity, bút 
one should alsó take intő account the innate ability of the Continental judiciary of 
being able to conform to any regimes.
As fór legal training, the autonomy of the universities following democratization 
increased in importance, as did the law degree, thanks to the growing need fór lawyers 
in a markét economy and democracy. Instead of the State controlling entry to the study 
of law, faculties began to open their doors to ever increasing numbers of students 
and, consequently, to increasing amounts of money. Under communism less than a 
thousand qualified lawyers graduated from universities annually, because strict State 
regulation maximized the possible number of students. Following the system-change 
the social need fór lawyers has grown sharply, the number of law students in Hungary 
by the year 2002/2003 almost reached an unprecedented 18.000. In addition to the 
radical changes in the regulation of professions, the emergence of markét pressures 
had the most significant overall structural effects on the legal occupations.
The autonomy of legal Science departments at the universities alsó became 
limitless, as they continued in their tradition of doing nothing much more than complain 
about low wages, in the meantime seeking other more lucrative employment. In 
Hungary the actual decisions on recruitment of personnel, the career and remuneration 
of judges, as one of the most important tools in ensuring conformity with the radical 
reforms, were given to the administrative elite of the judiciary. Thus the higher courts 
and their presidents have strong possibilities of influencing lower ranking judges as 
well as carrying out judicial practice without effective external control. This situation has 
corrupted the selection of judges and made a new kind of contra- or biased selection.17 
Nőt only are formulas, informál binding opinions, legal and ethical measures, 
appellate or review instances the tools fór guaranteeing conformity, bút through these, 
guaranteeing the career expectations of lower ranking judges.
This last example illustrates that institutions matter; the necessity of preserving the 
institutionalist view is very clear.
16 Hubert Rottleuthner, The Conformity of the Legal Staff, in: Karlsson, Jonsson, Brynjarsdottir 
(eds.), Recht, Gerechtigkeit und dér Staat, Duncker & Humblot, Reykjavik, 1993
17 Badó Attila, Hungárián Lawyers in the Making: Selection Distortion after the Democratic 
Changes in Hungary (manuscript)
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Players, actors, roles: law yers as active  agents
Evén from the middle of rapid changes in numerous spheres, one can notice the 
worldwide transformations of legal professions during the last decades. Fór those 
societies that actively changed their political, economic and legal systems, these 
more generál transformations created the background and the context, and it is 
evident that the adjustment to a changing environment generates new challenges 
during the process of transformation. Despite the stability of the final values of these 
transformations (rule of law, rights, democratic way of doing things, etc.), the routes 
to these aims, and the institutions that could encourage the ultimate success are 
extremely shaky.
The intensive work carried out in building institutions in the post-communist 
countries lends considerable significance to pragmatic advisors, legislatures and other 
designers bút little effort has been given to a deeper understanding and analyses of 
the reál activities of the actors involved in these processes. From a legal sociological 
aspect the highly important players are those in the legal professions who nőt only 
helped to create new, or renovate old, institutions, bút continue to recreate them in 
their everyday functioning.
From our perspective the most important roles in the legal system are those which 
shape the institutional activity of the legal system. Judges, prosecutors, even priváté 
attorneys in a system of justice, law professors, academics in legal education, in 
constitutional court or working as ombudsmen, administrators, bureaucrats creating 
legal measures and administering legal issues.
Periods of rapid change are rarely advantageous fór analysis, bút we can safely 
assume that somé deeper scientific research would be very fitting in this case. This 
research should bravely cross the disciplinary limits using different social Sciences 
(history, social history, legal sociology, jurisprudence). The frame of scientific 
conceptualization of legal issues should extend traditional limits. This kind of trespass 
needs brevity and enterprise, although cross-bordering is by no means new in the 
social Sciences. Understanding the legal professions sociologically needs this shift in 
perspective, especially in the case of societies under the pressure of huge changes. 
As an evaluative summary of the traditional aspects of legal Science one can accept 
Terence Halliday’s argumentation:
“Both social Sciences and academic lawyers have directed much greater 
attention to the recruitment of lawyers, legal education, professional organization, and 
stratification of the profession than to its work and its wider institutional impact. Seldom 
do scholars treat lawyers as principals or agents of institutional design, constructing 
and maintaining generál markét institutions, State power, or civil society.”18
Of course there is no space here to run through the roots and results of the 
cross-disciplinary project, we can only give a brief account, with somé possible 
research topics.
18 Terence C. Halliday, Lawyers as Institution Builders: Constructing Markets, States, Civil Society, 
and Community, in: Sarat, Constable, Engel, Hans, Lawrence (eds.) Crossing Boundaries. 
Traditions and Transformations in Law and Society Research, Northwestern University Press, 
Evanston, 1998, p. 244.
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This fresh line, which assimilates various aspects from history and sociology, 
assumes the active role of lawyers, it conceptualizes them as agents, nőt only 
mirroring the peculiarities of society, economy or State, bút constituting the institutions 
in which they are embedded.
In the tieid of sociology of lawyers such issues as how lawyers control the markét 
and with what measures they can reach competitive advantages in a free markét 
has taken a dominant position and reached its peak in Richard Abel’s monumental 
works.19 The problems of markét behavior, the control over training and admission to 
the professions, the role of the State in regulating working conditions were certainly 
decisive at the moment of transformation of the State in to the new democracies. 
Bút it should be more challenging to investigate the market-creation process, while 
lawyers are playing fundamental roles in designing markét institutions, forming the 
non-economic foundations of economic activity. They consistently do their jobs in the 
interests of Capital or big business by finding new paths fór their clients, constituting 
new forms of commodity exchange, insurances, etc. They are the inventors of 
institutions and “symbol traders” : “Lawyers invent relationships. This is their special 
skill, their indispensable contribution to Capital.”20
So the markét as a relatively new force in the old Eastern Bloc does nőt only change 
the setting of the professional work, as one can see, fór example, in the case of the 
attorneys who must face strong markét competition after years of security made by a 
numerus clausus. At the end of the 1980’s there were about 2000 practicing attorneys 
in Hungary, a decade later there were no less than 8000. This enormous growth of 
lawyers, and the huge increase in students following a legal education is symptomatic 
of all the new democracies in Central Europe.21 As a consequence of the “privatization” 
of this profession after somé decades of exclusivity ensured by the State, and due to 
the strengthened markét pressure, attorneys are widely differentiated. Additionally they 
have had to face the big law and counseling firms of the West that could now enter this 
new, unregulated markét. Bút lawyers are by no means only pure victims of the market- 
economy, they have proved to be successful in gathering competitive advantages while 
themselves creating the conditions. The markét is created by lawyers in different ways: 
during the first years of the transformation (and in Hungary even somé years before 
the political change) they were reformist advisers of the legislator, even advising in the 
political role of deputies or chief bureaucrats. The privatization of the State property after 
somé years of spontaneity (spontaneity was an euphemistic, bút widely used concept 
on the unregulated, sometimes anarchistic events) and other types of economic 
regulations, brought about a set of creations and somé new markét subjects and 
jurisdictions, new definitions of the legal practitioner, subject (Corporation), inventing a 
new kind of economic citizenship. It is highly important and decisive that the economic 
reform regulation, which created most of the markét players by constructing a new kind
19 Richard L. Ábel, Philip S. C. Lewis, Lawyers in Society, Vol. 1-3., University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1988-89
20 Maureen Cain, The symbol traders, in: Cain, Harrington (eds.) Lawyers in a Postmodern World, 
Open University Press, Buckingham, 1994, p. 33.




of economic legal personality, took piacé before the system-change and this fact alsó 
gave strong dynamism to other legal transformations. After the first democratic election 
in Hungary, bút alsó elsewhere, the Constitutional Court arrived on the scene as a chief 
designer and tried to reshape the social rights of the citizens, amongst other things. This 
activity sometimes seriously hindered the further reforms of the hereditary sickness of 
such institutions as the welfare system. This logic was openly present in the fate of the 
welfare reform in Hungary: in 1995 Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the 
cutbacks of the socialist welfare system.22
During the reform, and through the creation of the new markét institutions, lawyers 
alsó reshaped the markét morality, they constructed somé relevant concepts, such as 
dirty money, money laundering, corruption; this adventure seems very dubious and 
risky because these concepts are strongly value-burdened. Evén so, this creativity 
touched the legitimacy of the new system and gave legal forms to capitalism.
As fór the role and function of the State in the legal profession, it is widely known 
that in Europe and mostly in the Continental civil law world, professionalization was 
guided by government, States intervened strongly and circumscribed the conditions 
of lawyer’s work. The latecomers of Central- and Eastern Europe have experienced 
all the burdens of this type of State activity: the sometimes brutal force of the 
modernizers. It cannot be denied that lawyers under totalitarianism served as mere 
servants of State interest, and sometimes even as protagonists of the State ideology. 
Bút it should be clear that in those systems, and especially under socialism, lawyers 
played a limited role, their work as channeling and transforming Central requirements 
was simply unimportant, while Central command had a direct effect on society, at least 
theoretically. This alsó means that when the command economy was forced to reform 
from the end of the 1960’s, the lawyers’ role turnéd outto  be more important because 
indirect regulation of the economy did nőt mean liberalization only, bút regulation 
through legal means. This demanded the attention of well-educated lawyers during 
the creation and realization of legal regulations.
In the course of creating a moderate (limited) State, defining citizens rights, the 
writing of a constitution, lawyers in their role as participants of the round-table talks 
effectively formed the shape of the new democracies, continuing the long tradition of 
reformist “political lawyering” or lawyers’ participation in high politics. In fact, Central 
European transformations were largely concluded through constitutional measures and 
this feature gave the processes a peaceful, smooth character. The important contribution 
of lawyers in this process should alsó be recognized. Along with all compromises and 
faults, revolutionary law-making surely makes mistakes. In everyday practice different 
law professionals create and recreate legitimacy fór the State and rule of law, from this 
perspective a judge or a prosecutor becomes inevitable state-stabilizers.
In forming markét institutions lawyers have the function of giving rational 
legitimacy to priváté interests, since they — in post-socialist countries — have 
become defenders of individual interests after long decades of working under official
22 András Sajó, Socialist welfare schemes and constitutional adjudication in Hungary, in J. Priban 
and J Young (eds.), The Rule of Law in Central Europe, Ashgate, 160-78.
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communitarianism. (or at least under such a system where privatism was politically 
illegitimate). In influencing State affairs lawyers have the duty to form democratic 
“rules of the д а те ” and, even far more complicated, making the new democratic 
rules a natural element of social life. Their firm responsibility is to form a constitutional 
culture. Instead of complaining about the lack of this cultural background the law 
profession must design constitutional and legal values and legitimize them.
Bút it is well known that to ensure the stability of these structures somé social 
preconditions are necessary, the most generál concept of these is civil society itself.
In the sociology of lawyers the trendy view in recruitment to the legal fields has 
been set in a traditional eláss perspective, in which lay the social position of law 
professionals and its consequences. Inequality during recruitment and the level of 
meritocracy were the Central issues. This research perspective should be continued: 
today the inner conservatism of lawyers, the structural isomorphism of the ruling 
eláss or dominant strata and professions continue to leave room fór investigation. 
The social background of lawyers nowadays is a far more vitai topic since different 
kinds of Capital and their fruitful exchanges have proved to be important regulators 
of the social composition of various professions. Students from lower status families 
are at a disadvantage when attempting to reach the most prosperous careers. This 
kind of inequality, despite the official positive diserimination in the socialist period, 
and despite the democratic rush toward meritocracy in a democratic setting, 
remains unbroken. What is new is the relatively high salaries of the non-market 
legal professions (that do nőt compare with their Western colleagues), such as 
the judge and prosecutor, which are highly valued symbolically following the 
transformation to democracy, and somé years later this position has been turnéd 
to financial advantages. Thus, beside the growing pressure on the markét of the 
professionals, the regulation of judges’ careers became one of the most disputed 
and problematic tasks from a sociological perspective. This was largely due to the 
administrative elite retaining authority fór this issue by keeping to its autonomous 
administration of the judiciary.
In addition to this view, a much more dynamic relationship has alsó emerged, 
where lawyers’ participation in creating civility, and a civil society is a relevant task. 
Lawyers play a variety of relevant roles in the reconstruction of civil society in the 
new democracies, nőt only in connection with their own professional associations, 
assemblies, trade-unions, bút attorneys are strongly involved de jure and de facto in 
every voluntary association.
Somé historical investigations have shown that in Francé, before the 
Revolution, attorneys, sometimes in collaboration with judges, took part in the 
formation of an autonomous public, in redefinition of the sovereign authority 
based over the generál public. Across the 18th century, lawyers as the voice of 
the nation effectively monopolized the language of rights and followed symbolic 
struggles against absolutism.23
23 Dávid A. Bell, Lawyers and Citizens, The making of a political elite in old régimé Francé. Oxford 
University Press, New York, Oxford, 1994, Lucien Karpik, Lawyers and Politics in Francé, 1814- 
1950: the State, the markét, and the public, Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 13. No. 4. pp. 707-736.
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During the highly important and formative round-table talks in central-Europe, 
attorneys’ roles were decisive since they effectively shaped the agenda of the talks 
and formed the language of political argumentation. Without the involvement of 
lawyers, attorneys and legal scientists alike the “revolution” would nőt have become 
legally driven and peacefully constitutional. By creating the formai legal environment 
of legislative acts and legalistic argumentation and by articulating the language 
behind this, they created the solid base fór constitutional legitimacy. However natural 
rights discourse is alsó incorporated intő the constitutions, and it did nőt lose its 
anti-formalist, anti-positivist edge that was such an important weapon in the hands 
of dissidents arguing fór ethical progress.24 After consolidation of the legal system 
“natural law infection” as a political approach serves the populists more as a basis of 
the criticisms of rigid, technocratic formai law.
The task in forming legal tradition by shaping institutions and discourse is well 
known, bút poorly implemented in the sociology of lawyers as the function of diffusion 
of values and concepts stemming from constitutionality, rule of law and rights. The 
discourse of rights and liberalism, the logic of opposing the State with the help of 
individual rights revealing of pre-revolutionary Francé was missing in Germany, where 
lawyers defined their calling (Beruf) in institutionalizing procedures and Rechtsstaat.25 
In Central Europe intellectuals had always played crucial roles in social changes as 
enlightened or revolutionary substitutions of the bourgeoisie. When politics turnéd 
to strong feudal conservatism as in the interwar period, this role faded before a new 
wave of modernization. Such oscillations strongly touched upon lawyers in their 
professional roles, bút the strongest impact was that of state-socialism with its anti- 
legalist ideology to begin with, coupled with its ongoing hypocrisy.
It is reasonable to assume that through post-communist transformations, 
following many years of restricted importance, Hungárián lawyers had to accept both 
challenges: positing themselves somewhere between the French (strong emphasis 
on individual rights as defense against State authority) and Germán (more energy 
intő forming strict legal procedures, strengthening rational bureaucracy) models. 
Law-makers widely transformed the written law in the interests of a markét economy 
and the rule of law. The judges, in their highly complex situation, guarded the rights 
of individuals, ensured the stability of civil relations, and strengthened the legitimacy 
of the legal way of handling disputes. Attorneys as liberal advocates, among others, 
identified themselves with the interests of the clients and thus legalized social wants. 
Bút every legal professional stressed the legal formalism, underlined the limits of State 
action, and gave importance to legal tools in generál. Before the transformation to rule 
of law, dissidents’ argumentation in Central Europe emphasized civic virtue and morál 
authority against communist rule: in their minds the law should be used as a value- 
burdened political tool in favor of the oppressed. Bút this morally valuable activity 
could nőt be expected from professional lawyers because of their organizational
24 Jirí Pribán, The Concept of Legality and Legitimation Demands in the Post-Communist Czech 
Society, in: Febbrajo, Nelken, Olgiati (eds.) Social Processes and Patterns of Legal Control, 
European Yearbook in the Sociology of Law, Giuffre, Milano, 2001
25 Kenneth F. Ledford, From General Estate to Special Interest: Germán Lawyers, 1878-1933, New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 1996
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bonds, educational biases and ideological constraints; only dissidents standing 
outside official placements might be vulnerable to this call. From this perspective the 
new system is far less heroic.
The task of lawyers to settle disputes and encourage consensus forces them to 
share the responsibility of a developing community. It is nőt only a Durkheimian logic on 
professional communities as social integrators bút an empirical experience alsó in family 
disputes, small-claim personal suits, and on the political, cultural activities of lawyers in 
small towns as local experts. This latter activity extends the strict limits of “lawyering” .
In societies where the autonomy of voluntary associations based on the interests of 
professional groups was forbidden fór very many years, the shift toward community-like 
control of the corporate boundaries is demanding. Nevertheless different new challenges 
have emerged: in the case of attorneys markét pressure has grown enormously, judges 
must face heavy work-loads and need to agitate fór salary increases, bút in this case the 
associational life and strength has remained underdeveloped.
While attorneys were able to shape somé aspects of the markét institutions 
themselves during the transformation and, with the help of somé political Capital, 
they could stand up fór their individual interests. Judges and prosecutors are nőt in 
positions to articulate their needs individually. These public officers are forced to remain 
aloof from political argument, only the administrative elite is permitted to speak about 
professional interests. Nevertheless, the issue of salary is highly politicized, although it 
remains in the hands of official representatives only. A third way of defending personal 
interests was chosen by public notaries, they successfully lobbied fór strong legal 
restrictions on admission, thus their offices can be obtained only on a hereditary basis, 
they have managed to ensure that they can évadé all competition.
Every professional association must соре with a new situation in which the State 
cannot automatically defend their interests, concurrence appeared and conquered 
authority and clients, public voices openly criticize professional activities, divergent 
interests questioned the cohesion of community.
Despite the tremendous changes that must be undertaken by the legal professions 
without the advantage of comprehensive sociological research, a more dynamic 
account should be of value in completing the scene of the sociology of lawyers in 
which professionals are active agents. Lawyers now have a particular understanding 
of the formative years of the new democracies as they work at institution-building 
activities, when they are creating and upholding nőt only formai structures, bút alsó 
institutions. They are effectively taking part in value-formation, socialization, and a set 
of activities concerning civil society and community in a wider sense.
Social engineering as a realistic image of lawyers’ tasks can clearly be seen in 
an age of massive change. Our time is without doubt suitable fór piacing significant 
questions before legal professionals, since they are key players in a set of social 
changes worldwide and in the post-communist countries in particular. Unfortunately 
we are far from being rich in empirical sociological research, however the theoretical 
shift that could help in these investigations took piacé during the last decade. It is, of 
course, true that cross-disciplinary researches, which should be used in this case, are 
among the most complex and time-consuming scientific activities. Flere I intended to 
sign the relevance of this kind of research quoting only somé elements of a possible, 
hopefully comparative, investigation.
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